

國立臺北大學自然資源與環境管理研究所

101 學年度第一學期 『環境災害與風險管理』

課程講義 (十一) : 危害分析與系統可靠度
Hazard / Safety Analysis and System Reliability)

<http://seat.massey.ac.nz/143465/>

Lecture program for “Management of Information Systems and Reliability”

<http://www.ceet.niu.edu/tech/asse/tech482/>

TECH 482/535 Class Notes -- Industrial Safety Engineering Analysis

<http://www.ipedr.com/vol11/16-R10014.pdf>

Critical Review of a Risk Assessment Method and its Applications

● INTRODUCTION

□ Risk Assessment Steps

- ⇒ Identification of hazards likely to result in disasters: What hazardous events may occur?
- ⇒ Estimation of the risks of such events: What is the probability of each event?
- ⇒ Evaluation of the consequences of the derived risk: What is the likely loss created by each event?

□ Types of Risk Analysis (Molak, 1997)

- ⇒ Noncancer chemicals risk analysis and Carcinogen risk analysis
- ⇒ Epidemiological risk analysis
- ⇒ Probabilistic risk analysis associated with plant safety
- ⇒ A posteriori risk analysis
- ⇒ Nonquantitative risk analysis, or “common sense” risk analysis

□ Risk Analysis Techniques related to Safety or Reliability (Dhillon, 2003)

- ⇒ Fault Tree Analysis
- ⇒ Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
- ⇒ Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
- ⇒ Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)

□ Risk Analysis Methodologies: Qualitative Methodologies

● FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)

- Event Tree, Decision Tree, and Fault Tree
- Safety, Reliability, Risk, and Industrial Hazards
- Components: Result, Gates (and/or), Fault Events (input/output)
- Examples; Advantages/Disadvantages

● FMEA, FMECA AND HAZOP

- An Overview of FMEA and FMECA (<http://www.weibull.com/basics/fmea.htm>)
- FMEA Info Centre (<http://www.fmeainfocentre.com>)
- Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 失效模式與效應分析
- Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 失效模式效應與關鍵性分析
- Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 危害及可操作性分析
(http://www.acusafe.com/Hazard_Analysis/HAZOP_Technique.pdf)

**POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Front Door L.H.**

System 1 - Automobile
 Subsystem 2 - Closures
 X Component 3 - Front Door L.H.
 Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon
 Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg, J. Smith - OC, R. James - Production, J. Jones - Maintenance

Process Responsibility Body Engineering
 Key Date 3/31/2003

FMEA Number 1450
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 Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops
 FMEA Date (Orig.) 3/10/2003 (Rev) 3/21/2003

| Item | Potential Failure Mode | Potential Effect(s) of Failure | Sev | Class | Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure | Occur | Current Process Controls Prevention | Current Process Controls Detection | Dete | RPN | Recommended Action(s) | Responsibility & Target Completion Date | Actions Taken | | | | |
|---|---|---|-----|-------|--|-------|-------------------------------------|---|------|-----|-------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Actions Taken | Sev | Occ | Det | RPN |
| 3 - Front Door L.H. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Manual application of wax inside door. To cover inner door, lower surfaces at minimum wax thickness to retard corrosion. | Insufficient wax coverage over specified surface. | Deteriorated life of door leading to: - Unsatisfactory appearance due to rust through paint over time. - Impaired function of interior door hardware. | 7 | | Manually inserted spray head not inserted far enough. | 8 | | Visual check each hour - 1 shift for film thickness (depth meter) and coverage. | 5 | 280 | Add positive depth stop to sprayer. | | Stop added, sprayer checked on line. | 7 | 2 | 5 | 70 |
| | | | | | Spray head clogged - Viscosity too high - Temperature too low - Pressure too low. | 5 | | Test spray pattern at start-up and after idle periods, and preventive maintenance program to clean heads. | 3 | 105 | | | 7 | 1 | 3 | 21 | |
| | | | | | Spray head deformed due to impact. | 2 | | Preventive maintenance program to maintain heads. | 2 | 28 | | | 7 | 2 | 2 | 28 | |
| | | | | | Spray time insufficient. | 8 | | Operator instructions and lot sampling (10 doors/shift) to check for coverage of critical areas. | 7 | 302 | | | 7 | 1 | 7 | 49 | |

■ Risk Priority Numbers: **RPN = Severity x Occurrence x Detection**

■ Criticality Analysis

Mode Criticality = Expected Failures x Mode Ratio of Unreliability x Probability of Loss

Item Criticality = SUM of Mode Criticalities