

See it. Say it. Sorted. An empirical analysis of the influence of the British Vigilance Campaign.

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Abstract—Vigilant campaigns (VCs) have been implemented as counterterrorism measurements in countries like the USA since the attacks of 9/11. Yet, many European countries besides the UK are reluctant to implement VCs, being concerned of scaring their citizens by communicating potential terroristic threats. Previous academic examinations do not counter this concern, but only highlight VCs' potential of mobilizing individuals to report something suspicious. Thus, this paper questions the concerns assuming greater capacities of VCs, as they potentially create a feeling of safety and empowerment by sharing responsibility with citizens to be vigilant. The influence of the recent British "See it. Say it. Sorted."-campaign on individuals is empirically analysed, testing three hypotheses regarding individuals' awareness of terroristic threats, feeling of safety and changed behaviour due to the VC. The hypotheses find support, wherefore, this paper concludes that the beforehand mentioned concerns are not justified as there is no negative impact on individuals.

Keywords—*Peer-to-Peer-Surveillance, Counterterrorism Measurements, Vigilance Surveillance Campaign, Public Transport*

I. INTRODUCTION

British political authorities have claimed since the fatal attacks in London's public transportation of 7th of July 2005, commonly referred to as the 7/7 attacks, that terrorism will not change the way of life in the UK [1]. Yet, significant events like the 7/7 bombings are pivotal moments in order to introduce and legitimize new security measurements that directly and indirectly impact the public, just as the removal of litter bins in public spaces in the wake of Northern Irish terrorism demonstrated [2]. While surveillance technology is a main part of the British counter-terrorism discourse, it still faces limitation due to its asocial character of automated forms of monitoring [3]. Therefore, a community-approach is included to today's surveillance systems, i.e. the so-called vigilance campaigns (VCs) focusing specially on public transportation as it remains a favourable terroristic target due to its easy accessibility and difficulties to implement "airport-style security screening" [4]. VCs aim to establish a routine of citizens watching their surroundings and reporting suspicious individuals, behaviours and objects, influenced by the perceived threat of terrorism [5]. For the purpose of resonating with citizens, VCs entail memorable slogans and confidential text- and call-hotlines that are spread via different ways of communicative media, e.g. posters, radio spots, internet websites. The most recent British VC is the "See it. Say it. Sorted."-campaign (SSSC), launched in November 2016, with the eponymic slogan and an easy to remember anti-terrorist hotline number spread throughout posters and announcements

in British central, underground and bus stations, with a special accumulation in the capitol London [6]. While VCs are regularly implemented in the UK, concerns of scaring the public by communicating risk, threat and suspicion, the common language used by VCs, has caused reluctance of many European countries, e.g. Spain, Denmark or Germany, to launch their own campaigns [4], [6]. Academic research so far has not challenged these concerns, but rather generally focussed on the campaign's power of mobilising citizens to report to designated authorities [4], [8], [9], [10]. Using a quantitative approach, this paper aims to fill the gap of literature by analysing the SSSC, testing if concerns regarding potential negative effects of VCs on citizens are justified. Based on existing literature on surveillance, political-response-communication, and vigilance, the following hypotheses were formed and tested through an online survey that was conducted between 1st of July to 31st of July 2019, with a population sample size of 438 participants, focussing on London due to the previous mentioned accumulation of SSSC's posters and announcements:

Hypothesis 1: Due to the "See it. Say it. Sorted."-campaign the public is more aware of the threat of terrorism.

Hypothesis 2: People feel safer using London's public transportation due to the "See it. Say it. Sorted."-campaign.

Hypothesis 3: The "See it. Say it. Sorted."-campaign changed the way the public is using public transportation.

After a brief classification of vigilant surveillance, the research design will be introduced, followed by an overview of the results. The paper concludes with summarizing the findings and a discussion. At last methodological limitations of this research will be pointed out.

II. CLASSIFICATION

Vigilant surveillance has to be understood in distinction to other forms of surveillance. Especially, the differences to natural surveillance have to be stressed as they seemingly share the same objective: if citizens see something suspicious in public domains, they should report it to authorities. Yet, they differ decisively in their execution. Natural surveillance is based on architect Oscar Newman's concept of defensible space from 1972, where grounds and buildings are built to allow easy observation or even deter crime before taking place due to e.g. unobstructed windows, well-lit areas or the absence of blank walls [11]. Vigilant surveillance, rather, has to be understood as a form of policing assuming that crime is already taking place, urging its citizens to share responsibility of being vigilant and willing to report to authorities [5].

Compared to electronic surveillance, the most heavily funded crime prevention measurement outside of the criminal justice system in the UK [12], vigilant surveillance can overcome the asocial character of electronical surveillance. For example, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras often cannot sufficiently assess suspicious behaviour the same way as humans can, despite newest technological inventions [13].

Vigilant surveillance and its campaigns are not new concepts. It was often only used for neighbourhood- and street-safety. Its institutionalisation in a counterterrorism framework was implemented for the first time after the attacks of 11th of September 2001, in form of the US-American VC "See something, Say something". In 2006, it inspired the first British VC "If you suspect it, report it". Those campaigns, in addition to the most recent SSSC, are long-term campaigns, implanting (sub)consciously the act of being vigilant in the everyday lives of citizens, especially in public domains such as the public transportation [5]. Therefore, the SSSC can be divided in three parts: 1) individuals observe their surroundings when using British public transportation and spot something suspicious ("See it"); 2) individuals contact designated authorities either in person or by using the anti-terrorism hotline ("Say it"); 3) designated authorities check the provided information and decide whether to proceed with it ("Sorted"). VCs hereby can either picture or describe the "suspicious" individual or object that deviates from our society's norm or stay vague, relying on its citizens' understanding of suspicious behaviour and objects – therefore, entailing the danger of creating a targeted group, i.e. suspect community, based on prejudices, stereotypes and ethical heritages [5]. The SSSC illustrates four different scenarios of suspicious behaviour on its posters that are placed all over public transportation, ranging from a left-alone bag, an individual avoiding police authorities, an individual entering places not meant for the public, and lastly, an individual taking pictures of CCTV cameras [14]. The scenarios of suspicious behaviour remain black and white avoiding the possibility of identifying a problematic population based on racial stereotypes. It includes different genders and facial features of different ethnical heritages for the observer and for the person behaving suspiciously. It further avoids picturing anything religious, such as religious symbols or clothing.

III. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the previous mentioned hypotheses, an online survey was shared over social media platforms between 1st of July to 31st of July 2019 following a descriptive design. Participation remained anonymously and voluntarily, receiving no incentives. Participants had to be over 18 years old and must have used public transportation in the UK in the past two years. Participation was not location-restricted, as London thrives off of its multiculturalism and global tourism. London was highlighted in the survey, since there is an accumulation of the SSSC in the British capitol, having suffered not only several radical Islamic terrorist attacks but also having a long history with Northern Irish terrorism. Participants did not necessarily have to be aware of the SSSC in order to participate, however, if they were not aware of it, the survey skipped any related questions to the campaign and just took basic demographics of the participants. If participants were aware of the SSSC, the survey tested whether they understood the campaign, its message and intention and most importantly its implication and influence on the participants. No picture of the SSSC's posters were

included, in order to not influence the answers of the participants. From 517 participants, 443 participants completed the survey. Nonetheless, five of the completed surveys were not analysed, as they were not members of the survey population. Following the central limit theorem, with the sample size of 438 analysed participants, the confidence level is 95% with a margin of error of 5%.

The questions of the survey varied from closed to open questions, in order to overcome the restrictiveness of the former. Closed questions were mandatory and gave the participants mainly a choice of five answers. Open questions, that were not mandatory to be answered, were analysed through content analyses, intending to quantify the answers objectively by coding certain words, phrases or the overall tone. For further calculation, both were recoded and nominalized between [-1, -0.5, 0, +0.5, +1]. The values in the negatives reject the hypotheses and positive values support the hypotheses. The degree of rejecting and support are indicated through 0.5 steps.

This paper has three dependent variables reflecting the three hypotheses (Vh1, Vh2, Vh3). The results of the deduction for dependent variables are real-valued functions (cf. Table 1), calculated as the respective arithmetical average out of the sum of the average of their assigned independent variables (cf. description of independent variables Table 2). Finally, the control variables "Where did the SSSC catch the participants' attention," "Gender," "Age," "British Nationality," "Citizen of London for more than two years," were conducted, seeking to understand any relations among controlled and independent variables.

TABLE I. DEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Dependent Variables reflecting H1 to H3		
	Variable	Description & Coding	Procedure
Vh1	Threat awareness	Participant is more aware of terroristic threats in public transportation since the implementation of the SSSC. Participant is more aware since the SSSC = +1; Participant is not more aware since the SSSC = -1	Vh1 was coded as a nominally variable with a value between -1 and +1, calculated as the arithmetical average out of the sum of the averages of the independent variables Vi1 to Vi3.
Vh2	Feeling of safety	Participant feels safer using public transportation since the implementation of the SSSC. Participant feels safer since the SSSC = +1 Participant feels more unsafe since the SSSC = -1	Vh2 was coded as a nominally variable with a value between -1 and +1, calculated as the arithmetical average out of the sum of the averages of the independent variables Vi4 to Vi6.
Vh3	Changed behaviour	Participant changed its behaviour of using public transportation due to the SSSC. Participant changed behaviour due to the SSSC = +1 Participant did not change behaviour due to SSSC = -1	Vh3 was coded as a nominally variable with a value between -1 and +1, calculated as the arithmetical average out of the sum of the averages of the independent variables Vi7 and Vi8 as well as the result of Vh1. Vh1 is utilized in order to give an additional insight of subconscious changed behaviour.

TABLE II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Independent Variables	
	Variable	Description
Vi1	The SSSC is closely related to terrorism.	Vi1 analyses if participants understood the SSSC and if they understood it as a counterterrorism measurement.
Vi2	Terroristic risks related to public transportation.	Vi2 tests if participants find that there are terrorism-related risks using public transportation.
Vi3	General awareness of risks is raised through SSSC.	Vi3 examines if participants see an increased awareness of threats that links to an increased likelihood of others to report due to the SSSC.
Vi4	Feeling of safety.	Vi4 analysis the initial feelings of participants towards the SSSC.
Vi5	Feeling of safety related to terroristic threats.	Vi5 tests if participants feel safer in regard to threats in public transportation since the launch of the SSSC.
Vi6	Perception of deterrent effect of the SSSC.	Vi6 examines if individuals perceive that the SSSC has a deterrent effect, possibly decreasing the risk of possible threats.
Vi7	Behavioural changes since the SSSC.	Vi7 tests if individuals consciously find themselves changing their behaviour using public transportation.
Vi8	Likelihood of reporting.	Vi8 analysis if individuals make use of the service provided, by indicating if they would report something suspicious.

^a coding procedure follows similar coding as for dependent variables, cf. Table 1.

IV. RESULTS

In the following, the results of the online survey are briefly depicted and correlations are made. In total 438 participations were analysed, wherefrom 50 participants stated that they did not know the SSSC. Hence, those participants were not examined any further. Yet, it is noteworthy that 16 out of those 50 participants indicated that they have lived in London for more than two years and yet the SSSC did not catch their attention. 388 participants indicated that they are aware of the SSSC, whereof the majority stated that the campaign caught their attention while using the London Underground, as pictured in Fig. 1. Interestingly, a minority stated that they knew the SSSC from other places, such as TV or radio – nonetheless, the campaign did not run any spots on those platforms, while only its predecessor did.

Out of the 388 participants, 62.9% were female, 34.5% were male, and 2.6% were intersexual or preferred not to define their gender. The majority of participants were rather young, as can be seen in Fig. 2. Further, 44.3% of the participants were British, while 55.7% had a different nationality. 54.6% participants lived in London for more than two years, wherefore they have experienced the time before the launch of the SSSC. 45.4% of the participants either moved to London within the last two years or have just visited or travelled through London recently.




Fig. 1. Where did the SSSC catch your attention?




Fig. 2. Age groups of the participants

A. Result of H1: Due to the SSSC the public is more aware of the threat of terrorism.

The testing of H1 showed that participants had a general knowledge and good understanding established throughout ages, gender and nationalities. The majority of 77.9% showed a full or partly understanding of the campaign, which is reflected in an overall average (0.6). The median, however, lies within partly understood (0.5). Yet, when asked to describe the campaign in their own words, participants did not necessarily relate the campaign to terrorism. Terrorism was only used 47 times to describe the SSSC. Participants rather focussed on the mechanism of the campaign (cf. Figure 3).

Being directly asked, i.e. using the term terrorism in the question, whether participants relate terrorism to public transportation, the majority indicated that using public transportation is “only” related with “some terrorism-related risk”. A minority (2.9%) finds either no risk of terroristic threats or are indifferent. The other participants acknowledge that there are terrorism-related risks, however, they are almost equally divided to which extent (definitely 31.2%; some 36.1%; maybe some 29.9%). Hence, the average with 0.3 shows minor support. Control variables showed no significant abnormalities.

Participants were also asked if they see an increased awareness throughout the public and if the campaign would mobilize others to report something suspicious. 45.4% of participants thought that the public is more aware and more likely to report due to the SSSC. 27.1% agreed as well that the SSSC raised the public’s awareness, though they doubted an increase of the likelihood of reporting. Only 4.4% stated that the SSSC would be ineffective in its aim.



Fig. 3. Frequency of the 50 most common words used to describe the SSSC (excluding popular words like “etc.,” “and,” “keep.”).

B. Result of H2: People feel safer using London's public transportation due to the SSSC.

In order to test H2 and therefore if this increased awareness influences the feeling of safety, participants were asked to indicate what they feel when they see or hear the SSSC. While the majority indicated that they have neither positive nor negative feelings towards the campaign (50.1%), as reflected in the median (0), still, the average non-significantly tended towards favouring the SSSC (0.1). The answers were almost reproduced in the following question, when participants were directly asked if they felt safer or more unsafe due to the campaign or if the campaign influenced their feeling of safety/unsafety at all. The majority indicated that they always felt safe – with or without the SSSC (49.7%). It is important to note, nonetheless, that 4% voiced their concerns of racial profiling. As no ethnical heritage was used as a control variable, this is an issue that should be analysed in depth in further research focusing on racial implications. Interestingly, especially female participants responded that the SSSC contributed to an increased feeling of safety (see Figure 4).

Another possibility to determine the SSSC's contribution to the feeling of safety is tested through deterrence, asking participants if they think that the risk of possible threats decreases or increases due to the campaign. Here, the majority of participants indicated that they neither think the risk of possible threats decreased nor increased through the implementation of the campaign throughout the transit system (55.4%). Nonetheless, participants perceive the SSSC to rather decrease risks of possible threats (34%) than it increases possible threats (10.6%).




Fig. 4. Feelings of safety since the launch of the SSSC based on gender

C. Result of H3: The SSSC changed the way the public is using public transportation.

For testing the possible changed behaviour of participants, participants were asked directly if they have noticed behavioural changes when using public transportation. A significant majority of 62.6% stated that the campaign did not change their behaviour at all. Again, control variables showed no abnormalities to this result. Yet, female participants were more likely to indicate that their behaviour has changed due to the SSSC (18.1 %) compared to male participants (10.5 %).

As this tested only the conscious feeling of behavioural change, a follow-up question asked to specify why they felt that nothing changed or vice versa. This was in order to control the self-judgement of participants' perception of changed behaviour. In fact, the majority (58.8%) now stated that they eventually report something suspicious as well, while

14.9% indicated that they have already reported something suspicious. Brought in correlation with the participants' feeling that nothing subconsciously had changed, the indication of being more likely to report something due to the campaign can be considered a change in behaviour.

V. CONCLUSION

As the results show, H1 was supported finding that the SSSC increased the public's awareness. However, participants did not necessarily make the association of the campaign as a counterterrorism measurement. In fact, the campaign was rather understood as crime prevention in general, relating it, among others, to theft or sexual harassment. Reasons for this could be the lack of the SSSC defining the suspicious "something". Though, the SSSC gives four different suspicious scenarios, it does not explain why those scenarios could be regarded as suspicious. Another reason for the lack of association of the campaign with terrorism could be based on the fact that, despite the long history of vigilant surveillance, its institutionalisation as a counterterrorism measurement is rather young compared to programs such as the neighbourhood watch.

The examination of H2 finds support as well, indicating that participants feel safer using public transportation since the launch of the SSSC. Though the tendency is rather low, as many individuals claimed being indifferent about the campaign, there is no evidence for concern that VCs could scare the public. Even in those cases, when participants indicated that they were indifferent about the campaign, they still thought it was necessary for other citizens. This supports the implication of VCs: being vigilant is one's responsibility as a citizen within a community.

Finally, there was at first no support for H3. While this suggests that SSSC did not influence the behaviour of individuals, this must be examined in more detail. If only focussed on subconsciously changed behaviour, the results show that there is strong support that the SSSC influenced individuals subconsciously to be more aware and more likely to report. Here one has to be aware that subconscious changed behaviour is difficult to measure – especially using the technique of an online survey. Further, even the missing support of H3 can be regarded as a result of an effective campaign. Terrorism attacks on public transit systems negatively impact citizens, as a reduction of journeys using public transportation in the wake of terroristic attacks is measurable [15]. Counterterrorism measurements should not cause the same effect. Individuals should not feel uncomfortable using public transportation due to counterterrorism measurements as it would reduce people using public transportation, hinder tourism and hurt the city's economy. Therefore, it is positive that individuals did not consciously change their habits since the launch of the SSSC. Nonetheless, the subconscious change of being more aware and more willing to report is important and a sign of the SSSC's effectiveness, as people follow the instructions of the campaign without judging it as something negative or as an increasing influential inconvenience during their commutes.

Based on this empirical analysis, the SSSC seems to be efficient as a counterterrorism measurement. It increases vigilance and the willingness to report and, at the same time, does not scare or influence individuals' feelings of security negatively. Consciously, individuals use public transportation the same way as they did before the campaign, yet,

subconsciously, they are more aware of their surroundings and of suspicious individuals, behaviours and objects. Thus, the analysis showed that VCs capacity is greater than just encouraging individuals to report, but it is also efficient when there is nothing “suspicious” to report on, as it increases the feeling of safety by “simply” being implemented throughout public transportation. Further, previous mentioned concerns that VCs could scare citizens could not be replicated, as the overall influence on individuals of the SSSC is positive. On an individual level, the SSSC can be categorized as an effective vigilant surveillance campaign that slightly increases the feeling of safety.

Nonetheless, this analysis cannot paint a complete picture of the SSSC’s effectiveness. One of the reasons are the methodological limitations of the online survey. Further, the amount of reports in general, the amount of reports that the British Transport Police (BTP) follows up to, and the amount of reports that actually help investigations regarding terroristic threats or other crimes would need to be assessed in order to judge the overall effectiveness of the VC. Consequently, authorities like the Department for Transport (DfT) and the BTP should grant access on actual reports individuals make. Findings of [4] and [10] showed that the fear of flooding authorities with unnecessary information hinders the likelihood for individuals to report to authorities.

Conclusively, the findings of this paper demonstrated that vigilant surveillance is not only a great contribution to the extensive surveillance systems but also has a positive influence on citizens by increasing their awareness and feeling of safety. The eyes of citizens continue to be pivotal in order to win the war of terrorism [16], particularly with public transportation remaining to be favourable targets of terror attacks. Especially in European countries, where electronical surveillance is not as frequently implemented as it is in the UK [2], authorities need to rely on their citizens to be observing and willing to share information that could help prevent crime and, more specifically, terrorism.

VI. METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATION

The method of an online survey was used to assure that participants can voluntarily and anonymously participate in a survey of a sensitive topic such as terrorism and the feeling of safety, following the strict guidelines of King’s College London’s ethical approval under the reference no. LRU-18/19-12865 being a part of a master thesis. As the author tried to establish a non-influential environment (i.e. avoiding terms as terrorism, safety, insecurity, etc., at the beginning of the questionnaire), one cannot assume that participants were uninfluenced as information sheets and participation invites included some key words. Another limitation is measuring the credibility of answers. Yet, as the online survey remained completely anonymous, it is possible that participants were more likely to be truthful online than being approached in person. A disadvantage of online surveys, nonetheless, is the likelihood to reach mainly a younger age group. A more diverse age group could have been achieved through a survey in person.

Furthermore, the assessment of the overall tone has to be judged critically, as only the author of this paper categorized the given answers. Thus, a subjective tendency can be assumed.

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