大學部賽局理論

Syllabus (Spring 2015)

Chapter 1 (Introduction)

Part I (Representations and Basic Assumptions)

Chapter 2 (The Extensive Form)

Chapter 3 (Strategies and the Normal Form)

Chapter 4 (Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs)

Chapter 5 (Assumptions and Methodology)

Part II (Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings)

Chapter 6 (Dominance and Best Response)

Chapter 7 (Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance)

Chapter 9 (Nash Equilibrium)

Chapter 10 (Oligopoly Models)

Chapter 11 (Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium)

Part III (Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings)

Chapter 14 (Details of the Extensive Form)

Chapter 15 (Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection)

Chapter 22 (Repeated Games and Reputation)

Part IV (Information)

Chapter 24 (Random Events and Incomplete Information)

Chapter 26 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability)

Chapter 27 (Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation)

Chapter 28 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium)

Guided Exercise - Ch 2

Exercise - Ch 2

Solution - Ch2

Guided Exercise - Ch 3

Exercise - Ch 3

Solution - Ch 3

Guided Exercise - Ch 4

Exercise - Ch 4

Solution - Ch 4

Guided Exercise - Ch 6

Exercise - Ch 6

Solution - Ch 6

Guided Exercise - Ch 7

Exercise - Ch 7

Solution - Ch 7

Guided Exercise - Ch 9

Exercise - Ch 9

Solution - Ch 9

Guided Exercise - Ch 10

Exercise - Ch 10

Solution - Ch 10

Guided Exercise - Ch 11

Exercise - Ch 11

Solution - Ch 11

Guided Exercise - Ch 14

Exercise - Ch 14

Solution - Ch 14

Guided Exercise - Ch 15

Exercise - Ch 15

Solution - Ch 15

Guided Exercise - Ch 24

Exercise - Ch 24

Solution - Ch 24

Guided Exercise - Ch 26

Exercise - Ch 26

Solution - Ch 26

Guided Exercise - Ch 27

Exercise - Ch 27

Solution - Ch 27

Solutions to Selected Exercises (Provided in Textbook)